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INTRODUCTION
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER

'Within the year, the president of the United States delivered to
Congress a message dealing with mental health, the first that has ever
been delivered by an American president. It is but the latest indication
of the present pervasiveness of concern about the problems of the human
mind. Doctrinal law has, on the whole, been slow to accommodate itself
to many of the findings of the sciences. In the area of criminal responsi
bility, the problem of the lack of communication between law and psy
chiatry has already been the subject of extensive commentary. Some areas
remain as yet less incumbered with analysis.
Whatever may be true of other law schools, many of which Professor
Smith suggests neglect the mechanics of behavioral courses in family and
criminal law in favor of courses dealing with the "vested order," the Syra
cuse College of Law cannot be accused on that ground. The family law
course has been structured to provide the students with a broad range of
considerations from the behavioral sciences as a vehicle for the discussion
of the legal problems. A seminar in criminal law will have the same effect
for some problems in that field. A further outgrowth of this concern is the
present symposium.
Professor Smith's introductory article reminds the reader of many of
the difficulties which have been faced in attempting to incorporate knowl
edge obtained by science into the fabric of law. He reminds not only of
past failures but of present ones and suggests the increasing need for team
work in the medical-legal area. Between law and science, the whole fabric
of society may be spun anew, he states.
Before any spinning can be begun, however, one must face some rather
meaningful questions with respect to societal responsibility. These in turn
lead to an examination of the medical and legal ingredients of mental
abnormality.
vVe name mental abnormality "mental illness." If this characterization
results in acts comparable to the freeing of victims from chains, the label
is salutary.

One may question its utility, however, if mental "illness" is

taken literally as implying that the victim is involved in an involuntary
condition for the results of which he is at best only indirectly responsible.
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The problems arising from the application of such sweeping concepts to
criminal responsibility have been discussed elsewhere at length.1 In part,
this symposium examines the somewhat broader underpinnings of the the
ory. How analogous is the diagnosis of "mental illness" to the diagnosis
of other illness and to what extent is "treatment" in this area a problem
of a similarly medical nature as the treatment of other illness? Euphemisms,
if indeed "mental illness" is in part a euphemism, have been known to
have unfortunate results in the past.
The symposium examines the medico-legal role of the psychiatrist
from two standpoints. The first role examined is the diagnostic role in
which a psychiatrist identifies mental condition for legal purposes. A psy
chiatrist may, for example, make a medico-legal determination of the mental
competence of a person: to contract, to devise property, to manage property,
to walk the streets freely, or, analogously, to commit a crime, stand trial
for its commission and even be executed for it.
Courts allow psychiatric testimony on such issues and others not men
tioned, because the legal standard applicable to people suffering mental
derangement differs from one applicable to others.2

If mental illness is

<:apable of scientific determination, law would be presumptuous in accept
ing a non-medical answer as sufficient. If, on the other hand, the answer
is partially normative, other results may follow. Furthermore, if the diag
nosis is accomplished by methodology which requires less expertise than,
for example, x-ray interpretation, and leads to more dubious results, may
a trend toward greater psychiatric determination be judicial abdication
of responsibility? Dr. Leifer's article sheds light on this difficult question
from the standpoint of a psychiatrist.
The other role examined is the role of the psychiatrist in the treatment
of mental disorder. If a person is ill he should, normally, be treated by
a physician. Even such an apparent truism may fail, however, to explain
the desiratum in the mental area.

One can hardly doubt that the law

legitimately leaves the problem of treating contagious diseases to physicians.
Can the same be said of leaving deviant behavior to psychiatric treatment?
Does it, matter whether psychiatry is capable of "treating" in the same
sense? Is it possible that where deviant behavior raises societal problems,
these must be shared by both the legal and medical professions and that
any firm line between the responsibility for "correction" in the normative
sense and "treatment" in the medical sense is artificial? Dr. Thomas' ar
ticle deals with this problem, from the dual viewpoint of a psychiatrist
and a law teacher.
Adoption of scientific knowledge into law does not depend as much
on the status of the experts in the field as on the knowledge accumulated.
1. One of the latest symposia is the excellent one in 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1962).
For specific references see Tables, prepared by staff under K. V. Alexander, in
Lindman &: McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (1961).
2.
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Quite aside from the question of the role of the psychiatrist in the deter
mination of questions is the role of knowledge of human behavior on the
principles of law. Few areas of law fail to make assumptions about human
behavior; many of them are questionable in terms of the accepted scientific
thought. Perhaps, to accomplish the reweaving of the societal fabric, it
will be necessary to view and review large areas of legal doctrines in terms
of acquired information. One area considered ripe for such reexamination
is the area of compensation for psychic injury.

Courts have, from the

initial position of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.3 come a long way in finding
cause to allow compensation for psychic injury.4 In part, this change has
been the result of the increased manageability of the information once
thought so speculative as to be beyond control by courts.6 Professor Smith
analyzes the important problem of this type of injury from the focal point
of evidentiary problems.
The issue is, however, not entirely theoretical. The practitioner will
find in it many useful suggestions applicable to his practice. Professor Smith
gives helpful suggestions with respect to trial of psychic injury cases, going
so far as to suggest arguments to the jury in some cases. Dr. Leifer's article
will probably be of help to those practitioners who find themselves in the
uncomfortable position of being forced to cross-examine an unfavorable
psychiatric witness and explain his testimony to the jury. Dr. Thomas' article
will, undoubtedly, also be helpful. Furthermore, the authors suggest several
significant innovations. Professor Smith suggests the possibility of a medico
legal audit as a means of avoiding the battle of experts in medical injury
cases. Dr. Thomas suggests a campus clinic as a means of dealing with the
dangerous offender. These suggestions, as well as the theory which under
lies them, commend themselves to the careful scrutiny of the bar and the
teaching profession.
As is true with any symposium with a broad base and comparatively
small space, the articles in this issue only hint at broad areas that remain
to be analyzed. If the problems have been forcefully posed the issue has
fulfilled its purpose.
3. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
4. Halio v. Lurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961); Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5
N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958); d. Gonsenhauser v. New York Cent.
R.R.,8 App. Div. 2d ·i83, 188 N.Y.S.2d 901 (4th Dep't 1959) (extending doctrine to cows).
5. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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